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This Article argues there is a legal duty to disobey illegal nuclear strike 
orders. Failure to carry out this duty may result in criminal and civil liability. 
Because nuclear weapons are quantitatively and qualitatively different from 
conventional weapons, typical legal calculations regulating their use under the 
laws of war or humanitarian law, as well as human rights law, change along with 
the change in weaponry.  
At least five “unique characteristics” of nuclear weapons ominously 
distinguish them from conventional weapons in ways that promise only to 
increase civilian death and suffering. First, quantitatively, the blast power, heat, 
and energy generated far outstrip that of conventional weapons, likely rendering 
nuclear weapons indiscriminate. Second, qualitatively, the radiation released is so 
powerful that it damages DNA and causes death and severe health defects 
throughout the entire lives of survivors as well as their children. Third, nuclear 
weapons make virtually impossible humanitarian assistance to survivors at the 
blast scene struggling to survive, leading to more suffering and death. Fourth, 
damage to the environment may produce not only devastating environmental 
harm itself but also widespread famine and starvation. Fifth, nuclear weapons 
cause long-lasting multi-generational psychological injury to survivors of the 
blast. 
All of these factors weigh heavily against the humanitarian goals of the 
law of war and human rights law, which are designed chiefly to prevent and 
reduce civilian death and suffering. These humanitarian and human rights rules 
require distinction between combatants and civilians, proportionality in attack, 
military necessity, prevention of unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury, 
and prevention of the arbitrary loss of life. 
This Article’s thesis largely boils down to: If conventional weapons can be 
used to achieve the same or similar military objectives as nuclear weapons in 
proximity to civilians, and nuclear weapons are ordered to be used instead, that 
order may be manifestly illegal, leading to war crimes for which actors can be 
liable if they obey the illegal order. This universal customary international law 
applies both to state and non-state actors alike. 
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The destructive power of nuclear weapons 
cannot be contained in either space or time. 
 –The International Court of Justice 
 
I. Introduction 
This Article answers a series of complex questions given urgency by the 
renewed attention around the world to the possible use of nuclear weapons.1 For 
instance, is there such a thing as an illegal nuclear strike order? If so, what would 
it look like? And, if there is such an order, what kind of right or, more accurately, 
what kind of duty exists to disobey it? For the right arises out of, and is thus 
incidental to, a duty to disobey. Would the duty be simply moral or conscience-
based? Or is there a legal duty as well? And if it is the latter, what law governs? 
National? International? 
Moreover, what are the practical and theoretical implications of the 
answers to these questions? Are we talking about merely an affirmative defense to 
a domestic charge of not following orders? Or, perhaps, something of greater 
symbolic, real world, and legal value to the international system as a whole 
regarding how international law does and should treat the use of nuclear weapons 
around the globe. That is, an international legal framework applicable to all 
states—and even non-state actors—that holds specific personnel accountable for 
following illegal orders, even if the legality of nuclear weapons themselves as a 
general matter has not yet been definitively resolved.2 
                                                
1 For purposes of this Article, “use” means nuclear strike. Other possible “uses,” such as the role 
nuclear weapons play in deterrence and mutually assured destruction, are not included within the 
definition and are not the subject of this Article. 
2 The new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons pushes toward outlawing nuclear 
weapons altogether under international law. See Rick Gladstone, A Treaty Is Reached to Ban 
Nuclear Arms. Now Comes the Hard Part, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/world/americas/united-nations-nuclear-weapons-
prohibition-destruction-global-treaty.html?_r=0; Jacqueline Klimas, Nuclear Powers Rebuked As 
122 Nations Adopt U.N. Ban, POLITICO, (July 7, 2017), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/07/atomic-weapons-ban-united-nations-2017-240309 
[https://perma.cc/5MYX-P59D]. But as we shall see, infra Part IV.A., as a treaty, once it enters 
into force it will bind only states parties. Moreover, those states most affected by the treaty—
namely, nuclear weapons states—have refused to support the treaty ban and have rejected it as a 
broader norm-forming instrument necessary for the creation of general or “customary” 
international law. Both because this repudiation of the treaty is by the most powerfully affected 
states, and because the objections come at the genesis of the potential norm-formation, these 
nuclear “persistent objector” states stunt a broader, non-treaty prohibition on nuclear weapons 
under customary international law or, if such a norm were to form, it would not apply to the 
objecting states. See Dino Kritsiotis, On the Possibilities of and for Persistent Objection, 21 DUKE 
J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 121, 129–30 (2010). To be sure, the very fact that these states have both 
updated their nuclear arsenals and maintained their right to use nuclear weapons is strong evidence 
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This Article proposes a novel account of the law’s relationship to nuclear 
weapons. Thus far, the great bulk of policy and legal conversation regarding 
nuclear weapons has addressed in blanket fashion whether their use is legal at all. 
But the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has refused to categorically outlaw 
their use,3 and the reality is that states (and perhaps non-state actors) presently 
possess nuclear weapons and have expressed a willingness to use them. 
Accordingly, this Article addresses the different question of whether certain 
nuclear strikes would be illegal if nuclear weapons were used. And, further, 
whether there is a legal duty to refuse to carry out an illegal strike order, as well 
as the implications of any such duty—such as susceptibility to criminal 
prosecution or civil liability for serious violations of international law, like war 
crimes and the arbitrary deprivation of life. 
Hence it is important at the outset to understand what this Article is and is 
not about: It is not advocating the outlawing of nuclear weapons across the board. 
Formal international institutions combined with components of customary 
international law have largely settled that question, at least for the time being. 
This Article is also not a policy piece about the strategic use of nuclear weapons, 
examining, say, the desirability of deterrence through nuclear weapon stockpiling 
or the role that mutually assured destruction plays in preventing a nuclear 
holocaust. 
Rather, the Article’s argument is fundamentally legal and comprises at 
least three key questions: (1) when is a nuclear strike order illegal; (2) is there a 
legal duty to disobey the illegal order; and (3) what are the implications of 
refusing to disobey the order? As a preliminary matter, the analysis does not 
contend that all uses of nuclear weapons are necessarily illegal. For purposes of 
the Article, nuclear weapons, like all weapons, are permissible unless they 
contravene the laws of war or what is called international humanitarian law.4 
There may be some situations in which the use of nuclear weapons does not 
contravene the laws of war. For instance, the ICJ mused about “the use of nuclear 
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which its very 
survival is at stake”5—a scenario that ties into the discussion of “belligerent 
reprisals” later in the Article.6 Others have argued that “use of a low yield nuclear 
weapon against warships on the High Seas or troops in sparsely populated areas” 
                                                                                                                                
that the components necessary to form customary international law are lacking, as also discussed 
infra at Part IV.A. In the absence of a solid prohibition on their use, nuclear weapons remain—the 
Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty notwithstanding—legal for non-states parties to the treaty, i.e., those 
states that actually possess and therefore may use nuclear weapons. Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 21 (July 8) [hereinafter Advisory 
Opinion]. 
3 See Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 97. 
4 Id. ¶ 21. 
5 Id. ¶ 97.  
6 Infra Part IV.B.5. 
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might be legal under international law.7 These situations occupy a legal limbo 
where the use of nuclear weapons might be legal but also might not necessarily be 
illegal—in short, their legality under international law would be contested.8 
Instead of dwelling in this limbo, the Article concentrates on “clearly” or 
“manifestly” illegal nuclear strikes for which liability attaches and, in this regard, 
seeks to be a referent for commanders and soldiers tasked with the use of nuclear 
weapons in proximity to civilian populations. Part II begins by articulating the 
origins of a duty to disobey illegal orders and elaborates the “clearly” or 
“manifestly” illegal standard. Next, Part III explains why nuclear weapons have 
unique destructive powers, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as opposed to 
conventional weapons. The discussion of why nuclear weapons are uniquely 
destructive sets the stage for the Article’s principal thesis in Part IV: Under 
international humanitarian and human rights law, if conventional weapons can be 
used near a civilian population to achieve the same or similar military objectives 
as nuclear weapons, then it would most likely be manifestly illegal to use nuclear 
weapons. And, as such, liability would generally attach to a commander who fails 
to disobey a nuclear-strike order in this situation. One possible exception to 
liability attaching would be the doctrine of “belligerent reprisals.” As will be 
discussed, while the strike itself would remain illegal, it may nonetheless be 
justified under this doctrine and, accordingly, the doctrine may offer an 
affirmative defense to liability.9 Part V then discusses the chain of command in 
ordering a nuclear strike and issues of immunity, starting with the head of state on 
down. For only those with sufficient information to refuse an illegal order can be 
held liable under basic rule-of-law principles, so an individual’s position in the 
chain of command partly determines his liability risk. Finally, Part VI confronts 
the problem of non-state actors. It concludes that they are subject to the same 
standards and duties as state actors due to the universal nature of customary 
international law and international humanitarian and human rights law in 
particular, which are designed to prevent and minimize loss of civilian life. 
II. The Duty to Disobey 
A. The Duty 
The duty to disobey an illegal order to launch a nuclear weapon originates 
in international law’s rejection of the defense that an individual is excused from 
                                                
7 Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 91 (quoting the United Kingdom, Written Statement before 
the Court, ¶ 3.44). 
8 Customary international law is largely an empirical phenomenon reliant upon the practice of 
states, including entering into treaties, to define the contours of its rules. The office of this paper 
will be strikes that are clearly or manifestly illegal at the core of established rules of humanitarian 
law. Absent a universally or near universally ratified treaty, the legality of the peripheral gray area 
scenarios could be discerned only by some additional data, in the form of actual strikes and 
reactions thereto by states. 
9 See infra Part IV.B.5.  
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liability because he followed “superior orders.”10 Colloquially put, the defense 
goes something like this: “I cannot be liable for carrying out an illegal act because 
I was simply following orders.” At least since the Nazis were prosecuted for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity at Nuremberg, this defense has largely 
disintegrated. I say “largely” because the argument may sometimes be used as a 
mitigating circumstance where, for example, the court determines that justice so 
requires.11 But because those atop the chain of command are most likely to be in 
the best position to question and refuse an illegal order to use nuclear weapons,12 
it is hard to imagine this mitigating situation adhering in the context of launching 
a nuclear strike. 
In language that became pregnant for international humanitarian and 
human rights law instruments and jurisprudence, the Nuremberg Charter 
explicitly rejected the superior-orders defense. Article 8 provides: “The fact that 
the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not 
free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment 
if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.”13 Similar language appears in 
the Charter of the Military Tribunal for the Far East14 and in other international 
criminal tribunal statutes, like the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia,15 the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda,16 and the Rome Statute constituting the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).17 
The duty to reject illegal superior orders has also made its way into 
national law that follows or incorporates international law on liability for 
subordinates; for example, the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War 
                                                
10 See, e.g., Charles Garraway, Superior Orders and the International Criminal Court: Justice 
Delivered or Justice Denied?, 81 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 785, 785–94 (1999). 
11 See infra notes 13–17.  
12 See infra Part V. 
13 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement) art. 8, Aug. 8, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Agreement]. 
14 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 6, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 
1589 (amended Apr. 26, 1946). 
15 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art. 
7(4), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
16 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 6(4), U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).  
17 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter ICC Statute]. The ICC statute was innovative because it brought in the “manifestly 
illegal” standard that will be discussed immediately below. Article 33 reads in pertinent part: “The 
fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of this Court has been committed by a person pursuant to 
an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that 
person of criminal responsibility unless . . . [t]he order was not manifestly unlawful.” Id. art. 
33(1)(c). For an explanation of this change and its ramifications, see Garraway, supra note 10, at 
785–94. For a critique of the “manifestly illegal” standard, see Lydia Ansermet, Note, Manifest 
Illegality and the ICC Superior Orders Defense: Schuldtheorie Mistake of Law Doctrine as an 
Article 33(1)(c) Panacea, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1425, 1450–56 (2014).  
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Manual.18 As C. Robert Kehler, former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM) explains, U.S. soldiers are “bound to question (and ultimately 
refuse) illegal orders.”19 Yet, presaging the discussion below of the standard that 
applies when holding actors accountable for refusing to disobey illegal orders,20 
both the Rome Statute and U.S. law require more than just the receipt of orders 
that are merely legally debatable as to legitimate disobedience. As we will see, 
this heightened threshold comports well with real-world practice. 
Before addressing this heightened standard, it is important to clarify why 
disintegration of the superior-orders defense has birthed a duty and, incidentally, a 
right to disobey an illegal order to launch a nuclear strike. The reason is 
straightforward: If an actor does not refuse to disobey the illegal order, he or she 
violates the law and can be held liable. Both international and domestic law make 
plain that subordinates are not to carry out illegal orders. As the remainder of the 
Article shows, when it comes to nuclear strikes, those orders are likely to result in 
serious violations of international law, such as war crimes, for which actors can 
be held criminally and civilly accountable. In short, any command to break the 
law is ultra vires and gives rise to liability, which subordinates have a duty and a 
right not only to avoid but also to reject. What that law is and how it operates will 
be the subject of Part IV. 
B. The Standard 
But how to tell whether to impose liability and thus whether a duty arises? 
Yes, the order must be illegal—but how illegal? The entire structure of military 
command and efficacy would crumble if subordinates started second-guessing 
orders that they deemed of marginal or debatable legality. The standard adopted 
by the ICC and the U.S. military provides that the order must be “manifestly 
unlawful,”21 or constitute “clearly illegal orders to commit violations of the law of 
war.”22 Hence the threshold for disobeying an order is higher than just an 
arguably illegal order.23 It means knowing, or being reasonably expected to know, 
that the order is illegal and does not hinge upon solely contextual or situational 
judgments.24 Put another way, the relevant mens rea is that superior orders are not 
a defense if the actor knows or should know that the order is manifestly illegal, or 
grossly deviates from what a reasonable person knows or should know; the order 
                                                




[https://perma.cc/GU3E-26AE] [hereinafter LOW MANUAL]. 
19 C. Robert Kehler, Nuclear Weapons & Nuclear Use, 145 DAEDALUS 50, 55 (2016). 
20 See infra Part II.B.  
21 ICC Statute, supra note 17, art. 33(1)(C).  
22 LOW MANUAL, supra note 18, at 1048. 
23 Mark Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86 CALIF. L. 
REV. 939, 971 (1998) (“Where a soldier must exercise situational judgment in order to ascertain 
the unlawfulness of a superior’s order, that order is not manifestly illegal.”). 
24 Id.  
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must be illegal on its face.25 The U.S. Department of Defense manual cites as 
examples orders to “fire upon the shipwrecked” or to “kill defenseless persons 
who have submitted to and are under effective physical control” of U.S. forces.26 
It would also include the targeted murder of innocent civilians. For 
instance, if a soldier were ordered to shoot a baby in the head, that would be 
manifestly illegal and any subordinate should know it is illegal. It is this threshold 
that must be kept in mind as we move forward into the unique characteristics of 
nuclear weapons, the relevant international law governing armed conflicts, and 
the decisions made by those who have the power and the information to 
effectively launch nuclear weapons. 
In short, where conventional weapons can be used in proximity to civilians 
to achieve the same or similar military objectives instead of nuclear weapons, an 
order to use a nuclear weapon would be manifestly illegal and anyone with 
sufficient factual knowledge regarding the circumstances of the order should 
know it. In turn, that person has both a duty and a right to disobey the nuclear 
strike order. All of this hinges, of course, on knowing why and how nuclear 
weapons are different.    
III. Nuclear Weapons Are Different 
As the ICJ has recognized, and as science and experience demonstrate, 
nuclear weapons are different from conventional weapons. According to the ICJ, 
nuclear weapons have “certain unique characteristics” resulting from the release 
of “not only immense quantities of heat and energy, but also of powerful and 
prolonged radiation,”27 with the latter being “peculiar to nuclear weapons.”28 In 
other words, there is a “qualitative as well as quantitative difference between 
nuclear weapons and all conventional arms.”29 These differences render nuclear 
weapons not only uniquely catastrophic, but also uniquely unpredictable. Indeed, 
                                                
25 CrimA 36/91 or 40/61 Attorney-Gen. of the Gov’t of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 275, 277 
(1962) (Isr.) (quoting an earlier Israeli case, Kafr Kassen case App. 279-83, (1958), Ofer v. Chief 
Military Prosecutor, (A) vol. 44: 362). (“The distinguishing mark of a “manifestly unlawful order” 
should fly like a black flag above the order given, as a warning saying ‘Prohibited.’ Not formal 
unlawfulness, hidden or half-hidden, nor unlawfulness discernible only to the eyes of legal 
experts, is important here, but a flagrant and manifest breach of the law, definite and necessary 
unlawfulness appearing on the face of the order itself, the clearly criminal character of the acts 
ordered to be done, unlawfulness piercing the eye and revolting the heart, be the eye not blind nor 
the heart not stony and corrupt, that is the measure of "manifest unlawfulness" required to release 
a soldier from the duty of obedience upon him and make him criminally responsible for his acts.”). 
26 LOW MANUAL, supra note 18, at 1049.  
27 Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 35.  
28 Id. Importantly, I exclude here the ICJ’s holding that nuclear weapons may be lawful in “an 
extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the very survival of a state may be at stake.” Id. ¶ 
97. 
29 Id. ¶ 86. 
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as the ICJ aptly and forebodingly put it, “[t]he destructive power of nuclear 
weapons cannot be contained in either space or time.”30 
While some debate among experts exists as to whether a particularly low-
yield nuclear bomb might have a smaller blast yield than the most powerful 
conventional bomb,31 it is commonly accepted that nuclear weapons generally 
produce heat and energy that far exceed the capabilities of any conventional 
weapon, no matter how powerful.32 Unlike conventional weapons, which certainly 
can cause tremendous destruction (think the firebombing of Dresden), nuclear 
weapons create a fireball that forms in less than a millionth of a second at several 
tens of millions of degrees, vaporizing all matter into gas or plasma. There is no 
opportunity to plan for or escape the attack as in a comparatively “slow motion” 
firebombing; the nuclear detonation instantaneously incinerates everything in its 
path.33 Hence, quantitatively, the potential for destruction and the resulting loss of 
human life from a nuclear weapon differ from conventional weapons. This affects 
the law-of-war or humanitarian law calculi discussed in Part IV.B, as a matter of 
sheer blast power, scope, and detonation timing. 
Yet perhaps the most distinct feature of nuclear weapons is their 
qualitative differences from conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons release 
massive amounts of thermal and ionizing radiation. As Stuart Casey-Maslen 
notes, the effects of this radiation on the body are “prodromal, hematologic, 
gastrointestinal, pulmonary, cutaneous and neurovascular.”34 In fact, ionizing 
                                                
30 Id. ¶ 35. 
31 Compare email from Chris Jenks, Assistant Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law, to 
Anthony Colangelo, Res. Fellow and Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law (Apr. 17, 
2017, 08:23 CDT) (on file with author) and follow-up email from Chris Jenks, to Anthony 
Colangelo (May 22, 2017, 10:29 CDT) (on file with author) (“MOAB, with an explosive yield of 
11 tons of TNT, exceeds a number of lower yield/ tactical nuclear weapons. And I don’t believe 
that’s really arguable, there are federation of American scientists, US air force, and DoD sources, 
among others on the explosive yield of a number of tactical nukes being less than 11 tons of TNT, 
including the: B61, B65, W25, W54, the Davy Crockett, and the Special Atomic Demo 
Munition. To my limited knowledge neither the US nor any state intentionally develops tactical 
nukes any more, so anyone with that low yield a nuclear weapon is probably because they are 
struggling with design/manufacturing. But the broader point stands, that the MOAB has a greater 
explosive yield than a number of lower yield/tactical nuclear weapons the US has fielded at 
various points over the years.”), with email from John Burroughs, Exec. Dir., Lawyers Comm. on 
Nuclear Policy, to Anthony Colangelo (May 10, 2017, 12:33 CDT) (on file with author) (“So far 
as I know second-hand, and I have been following expert literature a long time, the lowest yield of 
the B-61 gravity bombs is .3 kiloton or so, an order of magnitude more than MOAB.”). 
32 Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 35.  
33 See generally SAMUEL GLASSTONE & PHILIP J. DOLAN, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(3d ed. 1977).  
34 Stuart Casey-Maslen, The Use of Nuclear Weapons and Human Rights, 97 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 663, 673 (2015). 
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radiation is so strong and pervasive that it actually alters the structure of atoms.35 
Tilman Ruff explains:  
It poses risks of acute illness (in high doses) and at any dose, long-term 
genetic mutations and increased risk of most cancers and a variety of 
chronic diseases, including cardiovascular and respiratory disease. 
Ionizing radiation has a high propensity to damage large, complex 
molecules like DNA, which are crucial to life, because its energy is 
delivered in large packets. A dose of radiation acutely lethal to a human 
being can contain no more energy than the heat in a sip of hot coffee.36 
Indeed, the duration of ionizing radiation’s effects may cause serious harms that 
last throughout the lifetime of survivors. Studies show that the occurrence of solid 
cancers increases in proportion to radiation dose, 37  as do hematological 
malignancies of blood forming organs (i.e., leukemia).38 To be sure, cancers 
caused by exposure to ionizing radiation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki persist to this 
day.39 
Just as devastating are the direct effects upon children and the unborn. 
Based on scientific reports,40 Peter Hayes adroitly explains in accessible terms, 
“already fused zygotes at [the] time of exposure; or . . . genetically damaged 
eggs/sperms in the survivors . . . that subsequently fuse . . . are non-viable in the 
lifetime of the survivors,”41 thereby preventing births within the survivor group.42 
Radiation exposure may also cause mental and growth retardation, 
“malformations such as microphthalmia, skeletal and genital malformations,” as 
                                                
35 Tilman A. Ruff, The Humanitarian Impact and Implications of Nuclear Test Explosions in the 
Pacific Region, 97 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 775, 801 (2015). 
36 Id.; see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, HEALTH RISKS FROM EXPOSURE TO LOW LEVELS OF 
IONIZING RADIATION: BEIR VII PHASE 2, at 6 (2006) [hereinafter BEIR VII] (“Ionizing radiation 
has sufficient energy to change the structure of molecules, including DNA, within the cells of the 
human body. Some of these molecular changes are so complex that it may be difficult for the 
body’s repair mechanisms to mend them correctly.”). 
37 BEIR VII, supra note 36, at 6. 
38 Ruff, supra note 35, at 801–02. 
39 Paul Voorhees, Hiroshima and Nagasaki Cast Long Shadows Over Radiation Science, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/04/11/11greenwire-hiroshima-and-
nagasaki-cast-long-shadows-over-99849.html?pagewanted=all.  
40  See generally NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, COMM. ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING 
RADIATION, HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO LOW LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION: BEIR V 
(1990). 
41 Email from Peter Hayes, Honorary Professor, Ctr. for Int’l Sec. Stud., Sydney Univ. (Austl.) 
and Dir., Nautilus Inst. for Sec. & Sustainability, to Anthony Colangelo (June 13, 2017, 20:17 
CDT) (on file with author). 
42 Some have even suggested that radiation exposure can cause trans-generational harms; that is, it 
may pass from one generation to the next as a result of the severely damaged DNA in those 
initially exposed to the blast. See Ruff, supra note 35, at 775; Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 
35; After the Atomic Bomb: Hibakusha Tell Their Stories, 97 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 507, 510 
(2015) (interview with Dr. Masao Tomonaga). However, the science has yet to empirically support 
this view. Thus, radiation exposure leading to trans-generational genetic effects is a perceived 
harm not demonstrated scientifically yet. 
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well as cancer during and subsequent to childhood.43 Again, these uniquely 
extensive effects of radiation have major consequences for the law-of-war calculi 
in Part IV.B; namely, principles of distinction, proportionality, military necessity, 
and prevention of unnecessary suffering.44 
It is also uncontroversial that ionizing radiation would make extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, any meaningful humanitarian response to a nuclear 
attack, effectively stranding those most in need—a position long held by both the 
World Health Organization and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement45—
further compounding and magnifying the suffering of victims, in both degree and 
number. Relatedly, the radiation released by a nuclear bomb is enormously 
unpredictable since it promises to cover a tremendous geographic area and is 
variously dependent upon uncertain factors like shifting weather patterns and 
atmospheric conditions, to which the bomb itself may significantly contribute.46 
Which leads into the dire environmental harms that major nuclear 
explosions or exchanges may generate,47  causing depletion in, among other 
things, the ozone layer, farming, and food production, thereby potentially 
resulting in famine.48 This is due in large part to the dispersal of dirt and dust, 
                                                
43 Email from Dr. Tilman Ruff, Assoc. Professor, Nossal Inst. for Global Health, Univ. of 
Melbourne (Austl.), Co-President of Int’l Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, to 
Anthony Colangelo (Sept. 22, 2017, 09:37 CDT) (on file with author); Tilman A. Ruff, Health 
Implications of Ionising Radiation, in LEARNING FROM FUKUSHIMA: NUCLEAR POWER IN EAST 
ASIA 221, 227, 229 (Peter Van Ness & Mel Gurtov eds., 2017). 
44 See infra Part IV. 
45 Elizabeth Minor, Changing the Discourse on Nuclear Weapons: The Humanitarian Initiative, 
97 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 711, 716 (2015); see also Gregor Malich, Robin Coupland, Steve 
Donnelly & Johnny Nehme, Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear Events: The 
Humanitarian Response Framework of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 97 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 647, 661 (2015) (“In reality, whilst calling for greater efforts at the international 
level as regards response to [nuclear] events, the authors recognize that the chances are near to 
zero of bringing effective assistance to victims of large-scale use of [nuclear] weapons.”); Ruff, 
supra note 35, at 812 (“It is important in this context to emphasize that no effective humanitarian 
response is possible for even a single nuclear weapon detonated in a population centre, let alone 
nuclear war, as has been the unequivocal conclusion of the World Health Organization and the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for many years . .  . .”). 
46 See infra notes 47–50 discussing environmental harms generated by nuclear detonation. 
47 I say may generate because there is the possibility of a surgical nuclear strike that does not 
severely impact the environment. This is contingent upon the strike not triggering escalation in the 
use of nuclear weapons. Because the command and control apparatus is unable to foresee whether 
the surgical strike will in fact produce escalation, the law-of-war calculation as to environmental 
damage is necessarily a post-hoc inquiry in this situation. As such, it poses an interesting question 
for those ordered to use nuclear weapons in a comparatively discrete manner. It seems contrary to 
the rule of law to hold actors accountable for the unpredictable environmental effects of a single, 
low yield nuclear strike that fails to severely impact the environment since liability would 
essentially be retroactive because the effect—escalation—is not necessarily predictable. 
48 Louis Maresca & Eleanor Mitchell, The Human Costs and Legal Consequences of Nuclear 
Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law, 97 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 621, 625 (2015); see 
also Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and the Environment, 28 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
265, 266–67 (2000) (“Of course, the two incidents which caused the greatest environmental 
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contamination of water supplies by radioactive residuals, and the consequent 
deterioration of both plant and animal life, posing a very real and widespread risk 
of starvation for many millions of people.49 In fact, using nuclear weapons for 
major attacks targeting cities or other highly populated areas could cause short 
term or even prolonged (decadal) nuclear winters for large civilian populations.50 
Finally, as informative as the cold hard science is, no account of the 
uniquely devastating effects of nuclear detonations would be complete without 
taking into consideration the actual human experiences, views, and psychological 
damage to those who have survived such attacks. In Japan, the survivors of the 
atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki comprise a distinct class, referred to as 
hibakusha. One of the foremost experts on the effects of nuclear exposure is the 
hibakusha Dr. Masao Tomonaga. He survived the detonation of the second atomic 
bomb on August 9, 1945 in Nagasaki and has had a long and distinguished 
medical career documenting human health and other harmful consequences 
resulting from the bombings. 51  Dr. Tomonaga recounts the horror of the 
experience itself and the lingering fears it instilled in survivors; namely, “[a]fter 
the initial wave of elevated rates of leukaemia, which continued for about fifteen 
years, a second wave of solid cancerous tumors began. Increased occurrence of 
these cancers still continues today and causes great suffering for atomic bomb 
survivors and their families.” 52  Similarly, Mr. Yoshiro Yamawaki, also a 
hibakusha of Nagasaki, describes not only the terrible experience of the 
detonation which haunts him daily and the reverberating impact of the radiation 
on his psyche and well being, but also what he believes are deadly trans-
generational ripples. In his words: “The effects go on across generations to the 
children and grandchildren of survivors, carrying on the cruelty of using these 
weapons. I have four daughters, and my oldest daughter has a type of disease that 
is similar to leukemia. My second daughter is suffering from breast cancer.”53 
However, the scientific data do not conclusively show trans-generational medical 
harm passed to children who were not in utero at the time of the detonation. 
Which does not discount the very real trans-generational mental harms 
caused by nuclear weapons and their radiation ripples into future generations. 
                                                                                                                                
calamity in the history of armed conflict were the atomic bomb attacks on the Japanese cities of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945.”). 
49 Maresca & Mitchell, supra note 48, at 641. Some might argue that this environmental harm 
qualifies as a breach of Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I, which prohibits “methods or means 
of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment”; see also Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 35. 
50 See generally R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. Pollack & Carl Sagan, Nuclear 
Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions, 222 SCIENCE 1283 (1983). 
51 After the Atomic Bomb, supra note 42, at 507 (interview with Dr. Masao Tomonaga). 
52 Id. at 509.  
53 Id. at 524 (interview with Mr. Yoshiro Yamawaki). Mr. Yamawaki’s attribution may well be the 
result of a lingering psychological harm and very real perceived physical harm originating his 
daughter’s disease. See infra notes 54–58. If his first daughter, on the other hand, was alive or in 
utero at the time of the bombing, her disease could be considered a direct effect of the bombing 
itself.  
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Robert Lifton explains that for survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki “[t]here is 
real fear about transmitting radiation effects to subsequent generations, because it 
is known to be possible.”54 This is “even though a systematic increased incidence 
of birth defects in the next generation has not been demonstrated in control 
studies.”55 Lifton also points out that survivors of the bombs at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki suffer severely from what he terms “psychic numbing.”56 In Lifton’s 
words, “[b]ased on all evidence, of Hiroshima and everything else we know, the 
numbing and listless behavior—no panic but a kind of listless, slow motion as in 
Hiroshima—would likely be so extreme among that tiny contingent of survivors 
[of a nuclear bomb] that people would be numb to the point of immobilization.”57 
Compounding these effects are the stigma and discrimination felt by survivors 
(indeed, in Japan they have their own special name) who fear deformation and 
disease will be passed on to their blood lines. This fear destroys deep-seated 
psychological comfort in “living on in our children and their children,” severing 
the chain of life.58 
In sum, at least five “unique characteristics” of nuclear weapons 
ominously distinguish them from conventional weapons in ways that promise to 
increase civilian death and suffering. First, quantitatively, the blast power, heat, 
and energy generated far outstrip that of conventional weapons. Second, radiation 
released is so powerful that it damages DNA, causing death and severe health 
defects throughout the lives of survivors as well as their children exposed in utero. 
Third, nuclear weapons make virtually impossible humanitarian assistance to 
survivors at the blast scene struggling to survive, leading to more suffering and 
death. Fourth, damage to the environment may cause not only devastating 
environmental harm itself but also widespread famine and starvation. And fifth, 
nuclear weapons cause long-lasting, multi-generational psychological injury to 
survivors of the blast. All of these factors weigh heavily against the humanitarian 
goals of the law of war, which is designed chiefly to prevent and reduce civilian 
death and suffering. 
IV. Law 
A. Baselines 
Before jumping into the specifics of international humanitarian and human 
rights law, some foundations, or baselines, from which to build my argument 
should be laid out. 
A somewhat preliminary baseline is that the law of war goes by a few 
names; it also may be called the law of armed conflict or international 
                                                
54  Robert Lifton, Beyond Psychic Numbing: A Call to Awareness, 52(4) AMER. J. 
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 619, 621 (1982). 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 623. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 626.  
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humanitarian law. The term international humanitarian law will be used 
throughout the rest of the Article to alliteratively partner it with the related but 
distinct field of human rights law. While humanitarian law governs the conduct of 
hostilities, human rights law applies everywhere and to everyone. 59  Put 
differently, while armed conflict triggers humanitarian law, human rights law is 
ever present and ever applicable, regardless of situation—including armed 
conflict. The concurrent jurisdiction furnished by these two overlapping bodies of 
law gives rise to the possibility of conflicts of law. Yet, as discussed in more 
detail below,60 the more specific lex specialis of humanitarian law tends to inform 
and complement the governing standards of human rights law during armed 
conflict, such that human rights law effectively adopts, or is heavily informed by, 
international humanitarian law for certain wartime rules.61  
Another baseline is that humanitarian and human rights law are 
quintessentially international law.62  To underestimate the importance of this 
baseline would be a serious and ultimately very confusing mistake. It is true that 
these laws are often incorporated into domestic law,63 but their source and 
substance derive not from domestic lawmaking apparatuses but instead from 
international law.64 
                                                
59 Here I take a customary international law view of human rights rather than a strict treaty-based 
view under which, according to the U.S. position, only states are obliged to uphold human rights 
abuses within their respective territories or under their effective control. Under customary law, all 
human beings have certain fundamental rights—including the right not to be arbitrarily deprived 
of life—that may be enforced against individual defendants, see infra Part IV.C. While a 
traditional view of human rights involved the state qua state’s obligation to individuals, recent 
developments like the prolific U.S. Alien Tort Statute litigation have made clear, even in the 
United States, that individual human beings (and perhaps private corporations) can be liable for 
depriving other human beings of fundamental human rights. These rights are also not limited to a 
state’s territory but rather apply everywhere, since “there is no jurisdictional limitation to the reach 
of international human rights law, at least as it applies to nuclear weapons.” Casey-Maslen, supra 
note 34, at 666. 
60 See infra notes 124–127, acknowledging the debate surrounding this topic but adopting the ICJ 
view in the Advisory Opinion so as to move the Article forward. 
61 I acknowledge that this is a hotly debated point. See generally Marko Milanovic, The Lost 
Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law, in THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 78 
(Jens David Ohlin ed., 2014); DARAGH MURRAY ET. AL, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2016). However, I do not have the space to fully explore it in 
this Article. As I discuss in Part IV.C, below, because the ICJ adopted the view of lex specialis 
articulated above in its Advisory Opinion, see Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 25, I adopt it 
here for purposes of moving the discussion forward. 
62 Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 75; see also infra note 63. 
63 LOW MANUAL, supra note 18, at 1059–60. 
64  Kehler, supra note 19, at 58 (former Commander of U.S. STRATCOM describing his 
“responsibility to implement and enforce . . . the president’s direction to ensure [that] plans 
compl[ied] with the body of international law generally described as LOAC.”). For more on the 
United States’ accepting Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention as customary 
international law binding on the United States, see Jeffrey G. Lewis & Scott D. Sagan, The 
Nuclear Necessity Principle: Making U.S. Targeting Policy Conform with Ethics & the Laws of 
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Next, there are two key types of international law at issue when it comes 
to how humanitarian and human rights laws are made and operate: treaties and 
custom.  There is treaty law, whereby states ratify an instrument providing for 
certain humanitarian and human rights protections. And then there is what is 
called “customary international law.” 
Treaty law is probably the easier to comprehend because it can crudely be 
analogized to a contract: states contract (treaty) with each other to provide certain 
humanitarian and human rights protections. If a state breaches the contract, other 
states may similarly breach or take counter-measures against the breaching state 
to either bring it into compliance or kick it out of the contractual community 
(treaty regime). Finally, as with a contract, the treaty does not bind states that 
have not assented to, or, in international legal speak, ratified, the agreement. 
Custom is trickier. It is comprised of two elements: (1) state practice; and 
(2) opinio juris—that is, the intent or belief that the practice arises out of a sense 
of legal obligation. Unlike treaty law, this form of international law is not like a 
contract. Quite the contrary, its law binds all states regardless of whether they 
have ratified a treaty. As a binding customary law for all states, and indeed, all 
actors everywhere, it may be thought of as a universal law that covers the globe. 
In fact, there are some offenses—including war crimes—that give rise to what is 
called “universal jurisdiction,” meaning any state in the world has jurisdiction to 
prosecute the perpetrators.65 
To satisfy the state-practice component of customary international law, the 
practice must be consistent and widespread; and although the precise threshold for 
widespread is as yet unresolved, there must at a minimum be a supermajority of 
states that agree to and follow the rule consistently.66 The opinio juris component 
can be gleaned from official statements and actions demonstrating that states 
follow the practice out of a sense of legal obligation and not just for purely 
political or expedient ends. This is sometimes referred to as the “psychological” 
element of the customary law equation because it purports to get into the mind of 
the state and communicate its thinking.67 While obviously relying in large part on 
a fictional anthropomorphization of the state (since states tend not to be 
                                                                                                                                
War, 145 DAEDALUS 62, 67 (2016); Brian Egan, International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the 
Counter-ISIL Campaign: Some Observations, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 235, 241–43 (2016).  
65 See generally Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 149 (2006). 
66 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) 
(“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by 
them from a sense of legal obligation.”) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW]. While it may be difficult to prove state practice with respect to nuclear weapons for the 
same reason it is difficult to prove a negative, the absence of their use by states points to a practice 
of, at minimum, restraint. It should also be noted that treaties themselves may, in certain 
circumstances, constitute strong evidence of custom because they represent the state practice of 
entering into the treaty and the opinio juris of treating the terms of that treaty as legally binding.  
67 Anthony A. D’Amato, Groundwork for International Law, 108 AM J. INT’L L. 650, 666 (2014). 
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monolithic in their decision-making), the psychological element nonetheless may 
be a useful heuristic for understanding what is meant by opinio juris. 
Now, generally speaking, a state may treaty around the default customary 
rule in the same way parties may contract around a default common law rule. But 
there are some norms of customary international law that cannot be circumvented 
by treaty. These mandatory rules are called jus cogens, or peremptory norms of 
international law.68 They are mostly framed in terms of prohibitions: no genocide, 
no torture, no crimes against humanity, no war crimes.69 Thus a state cannot 
decide, on its own, to opt out of these prohibitions. Nor can it treaty with another 
state to do the same. It would be as if Hitler and Mussolini entered into an 
agreement to exterminate ethnic minorities. Jus cogens would immediately swoop 
in to invalidate that treaty from the start. It is necessary to stress again, however, 
that these norms are framed in the nature of prohibitions: no genocide, no war 
crimes, etc. They have little if anything to say about if and how liability attaches 
to a violation of the norm—just that there is a violation of international law. This 
is of crucial importance to the discussion of belligerent reprisals below70 because 
it may synthesize jus cogens with other doctrines humanitarian law which 
authorize otherwise unlawful conduct, at least insofar as liability is concerned. 
A final baseline: there is a difference between the law of going to war (jus 
ad bellum) and the humanitarian law of how one conducts war (jus in bello).71 
This Article is principally concerned with the latter—how hostilities are 
conducted—because that is the realm in which an illegal strike order would be 
handed down. Put another way, even if a nuclear-strike order would start a legally 
authorized war (jus ad bellum), it is a separate question whether the strike order 
itself is a legal means of conducting the military action (jus in bello).  
In short, humanitarian and human rights law are distinct but related strands 
of international law, which may be based in treaty or custom. If the law is 
customary, then it applies to all states and, Part VI argues, also to non-state actors. 
Indeed, customary international law covers the entire globe and applies to 
everyone (that is, after all, the entire point of a truly international law). Although 
not every state has ratified the most relevant treaties governing humanitarian 
law—in particular Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions—certain 
principles of humanitarian and human rights law have passed into custom.72 
Moreover, some customary law, like prohibitions on war crimes and arbitrary loss 
of life, have become jus cogens73 and are also subject to universal jurisdiction.74 
                                                
68 RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 66, § 702. 
69 Id.; see also Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 83; Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A 
Fiduciary Duty of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 331 (2009). 
70 See infra Part IV.C. 
71 See generally Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad 
Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47 (2009). 
72 Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 41. 
73 See id. ¶ 83; ICC Statute, supra note 17, art. 5(c); RESTATEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW, supra note 66, § 702(c). 
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Accordingly, the major question for the next section is: “What types of orders to 
detonate nuclear weapons are manifestly illegal under international humanitarian 
and human rights law?” 
B. Humanitarian Law 
Four fundamental principles govern international humanitarian law: 
distinction between combatants and civilians, proportionality, military necessity, 
and the prevention of unnecessary suffering. These principles are classed in the 
jus in bello category and any serious violation of humanitarian law is considered a 
war crime.75 The differences between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons 
alter the analysis of each principle under humanitarian law. The result is that an 
order to launch a nuclear weapon is legally distinct from an order to launch a 
conventional weapon. Since the nuclear launch order is legally distinct, or at least 
produces legally distinct real-world outcomes, it invites a distinct legal analysis 
that may well yield a different legal outcome. It is an analysis and an outcome 
with which those responsible for deploying nuclear weapons ought to be 
intimately familiar because it can mean the difference between a lawful strike and 
a humanitarian or human rights violation and, consequently, the difference 
between following a legal nuclear strike order and a duty and right to disobey an 
illegal one. 
Before getting into specifics, the difference between legal standards and 
legal rules should be emphasized. A legal rule is a hard and fast line, the content 
and application of which are easy to administer—think: “Do not exceed the speed 
limit.” Either one exceeds the speed limit or one does not. Legal rules have the 
                                                                                                                                
74 See Colangelo, supra note 65, at 149.  
75 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 85, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I], which provides: 
 
3. In addition to the grave breaches defined in Article 11, the following acts shall be 
regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when committed wilfully, in violation of the 
relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death or serious injury to body or 
health:  
(a)  Making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack;  
(b) Launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian 
 objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury 
to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) 
(iii);  
(c) Launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in 
the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians 
or damage to civilian objects, as denned in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii);  
(d) Making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of attack;  
(e) Making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he is hors de combat;  
(f) The perfidious use, in violation of Article 37, of the distinctive emblem of the red 
cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other protective signs recognized by 
the Conventions or this Protocol. 
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advantage of ex ante clarity and administrative efficiency, but they often give rise 
to after-the-fact exceptions when challenged. A legal standard, by contrast, is a 
purposefully flexible and context-specific guiding principle, the content and 
application of which are more situational—think: “Drive reasonably.” Both the 
rule and the standard would prohibit driving recklessly but the standard may 
permit, say, going above the speed limit to get someone in urgent need to the 
hospital, while the rule unambiguously prohibits it. Much of humanitarian law is 
essentially standard based. That is, while the principles may sometimes sound like 
rules in a vacuum, their application in real life is contextual. Thus, what 
constitutes a “proportional” attack under humanitarian law will depend on the 
precise situation on the ground, the military advantage expected, the probability 
and degree of expected civilian deaths, and—crucially—the type of weapon 
used.76 
As largely a collection of standards, humanitarian law mostly lacks the 
situational clarity that rules enjoy. Rather, as noted, application of humanitarian 
law standards is highly contextual. As such, there is less certainty at the moment 
an order is handed down that the order would be illegal under the laws of war. 
Accordingly, holding an individual to a strict legal-versus-illegal line in the sand 
would be both unfair and unrealistic given the pressures and need to obey orders 
generally in situations of armed conflict, lest the entire edifice of military 
effectiveness disintegrate. Rather, as already noted,77 the needle moves in favor of 
a presumption of an order’s legality, such that to refuse the order it must be 
“manifestly illegal,” not merely of arguable legality.78 The manifestly illegal 
standard not only creates an affirmative defense to the charge of disobeying 
orders in military proceedings;79 it also insulates defendants from borderline or 
even sensationalist allegations of war crimes since in any armed conflict there is a 
high probability of civilian death, some of which may be permissible under 
international law. 
1. Distinction 
The principle of distinction or protection of civilians not taking part in 
hostilities is in many ways the wellspring of all humanitarian law principles. A 
famous formulation is found in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 
(which embodies customary law80): 
                                                
76 See, e.g., id., art. 57(2)(a)(ii) (“With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: 
those who plan or decide upon an attack shall . . . take all feasible precautions in the choice of 
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”). 
77 See supra Part II.D. 
78 See id. 
79 See, e.g., JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES 
Rule 916(d) (2016). 
80 See Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 41, 75.  
2018 / Duty to Disobey 
 
103 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall 
direct their operations only against military objectives.81 
As their names suggest, military personnel and military objects contribute to 
military action and objectives. The destruction, capture, or neutralization of such 
action and objectives must be designed to offer a direct military advantage and 
must not target civilian populations.82 To adhere to the principle of distinction, 
military forces must refrain from using means and methods that strike without 
distinction near a civilian population. Moreover, the methods or means of attack 
must protect against effects that cannot be limited as required by international 
humanitarian law,83 a point to which we will return below.84 This is often referred 
to as the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks85—a humanitarian law that attends 
the bedrock distinction principle. 
Nuclear weapons have the potential to annihilate this bedrock distinction 
principle. If civilians are within the radius of the immense blast yield, they will be 
incinerated along with military personnel and objectives.86 Unlike conventional 
weapons, which can more accurately target military personnel and objectives, 
nuclear weapons indiscriminately pulverize anything in their detonation zone, 
                                                
81 Additional Protocol I, supra note 75, art. 48. Similarly, Article 51(2) provides: “The civilian 
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats 
of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
prohibited.” And J.I. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck explain: 
 
The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. 
Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against 
civilians . . . . The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian 
objects and military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects. 
 
J.I. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR 3 (2005).  
82 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 81, at 25–26, 29. 
83 Maresca & Mitchell, supra note 47, at 629; Additional Protocol I, supra note 75, art. 
57(2)(a)(ii). 
84 See infra Part IV.B.2 (addressing the proportionality principle). 
85 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 75, art. 51(4): 
 
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: 
(a)  those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a 
specific military objective; or 
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be 
limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a 
nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction. 
 
86 Strictly speaking, there is a difference between the blast zone and the thermal heat zone. They 
will overlap but it is the latter that will incinerate people, as opposed to the blast effects, primary 
and secondary. At the core people will simply evaporate. 
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which promises to be far larger than that of any conventional weapon. 
Furthermore, the ionizing radiation emanates well beyond the blast yield, killing 
and harming innocent civilians (as well as their unborn children). The breadth of 
effects caused by a nuclear blast means that it would be difficult to say it was 
“directed” against the military objective around which civilians are located, 
especially in contradistinction to conventional weapons. In brief, a nuclear blast in 
any area with a civilian population would almost by definition manifestly violate 
the cardinal principle of distinction where a conventional weapon option is 
available, and would thus constitute a war crime. 
Here an analogy can be made to biological weapons, which the 
international community has outlawed.87 To borrow a phrase used by the ICJ in 
the context of nuclear weapons, biological weapons also cannot be contained in 
space or time. Like the indiscriminate and unpredictable consequences 
geographically and temporally of biological weapons on civilian populations, the 
repercussions of nuclear weapons are extraordinarily unpredictable and have the 
potential to affect people far into the future and, some would argue, even future 
generations.88 Thus, where effective weapons—like conventional weapons—can 
be contained in space and time and are not used in favor of weapons which 
cannot—like nuclear weapons—use of nuclear weapons would be manifestly 
illegal under humanitarian law. 
2. Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality appears in a number of places in 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. For instance, Article 51(5)(b) 
prohibits: “[A]n attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”89 Article 57(2)(a)(iii) and (b) effectively repeat this language.90 And, 
according to Article 57(2)(a)(ii): 
[W]ith respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: those 
who plan or decide upon an attack shall: take all feasible precautions in 
the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in 
any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians 
and damage to civilian objects.91  
                                                
87 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and 
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65; Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. 
88 Tilman A. Ruff, The Humanitarian Impact and Implications of Nuclear Test Explosions in the 
Pacific Region, 97 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 775 (2015); see also supra note 53. 
89 Additional Protocol I, supra note 75, art. 51(5)(b). 
90 Id. art. 57(2)a(iii), 57(2)(b). 
91 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii). 
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In other words, an attack—even an attack that is anticipated to achieve a concrete 
and direct military advantage—cannot disproportionately kill or injure civilians. 
Rather, both the anticipated military advantage and the loss of civilian life must 
be calculated prior to the attack. In this sense, and as the language makes plain, 
there is a foreseeability criterion built into the proportionality standard.92 Thus, 
like other standards, the test for proportionality considers what is reasonable 
under the circumstances. 
As opposed to a conventional weapon attack, a strategic nuclear attack 
near a civilian population is exceedingly likely to be disproportionate. 
Conventional weapons, and especially “smart” weapons, can target discrete 
military objectives even within civilian populated areas. Yet when it comes to 
nuclear weapons, the number of civilians killed and injured will be exponentially 
magnified by the larger blast yield and radiation; again, with the latter inflicting 
death and disease throughout the lifetime of survivors of the initial blast—surely a 
foreseeable consequence given the experience and extensive studies done 
regarding the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Consequently, there is a high 
probability that any nuclear attack near a civilian population would be clearly 
disproportionate and, hence, manifestly illegal, if a conventional weapon 
alternative is available to achieve the same military objectives. Again, the analogy 
to biological weapons is instructive: like nuclear weapons, these types of weapons 
cause far more harm spatially and temporally than conventional weapons, 
rendering them disproportionate. Indeed, biological weapons were banned for this 
very reason.93 
3. Military Necessity 
A leading treatise on international criminal law describes the principle of 
military necessity by stating that “no act of violence can be used that does not 
contribute to overcoming the enemy, whereas any act that helps overcome the 
enemy is permissible unless other jus in bello principles prohibit it.”94 Similarly, 
the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual includes the language, 
“[m]ilitary necessity does not justify actions that are prohibited by the law of 
war,”95 and the British Joint Service Manual of The Law of Armed Conflict 
defines military necessity as a principle that permits “those measures which are 
                                                
92 There may be a retroactivity problem if, at the stage of planning, the strike looks legal but 
unforeseeable consequences due to the shifting of circumstances renders the strike illegal when 
executed. In such a situation, “what is reasonable under the circumstances” should mean what is 
reasonable under the circumstances during the time the strike was planned; not an ex post 
evaluation of the legality in light of changed circumstances. 
93 Supra note 87; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 
L.N.T.S. 65; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 
U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. 
94  DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1040–41 (2010).  
95 LOW MANUAL, supra note 18, ¶ 2.2.2.1. 
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indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to 
the modern law and usages of war.”96 Just war theorists call this the “necessity 
principle.” Namely, the requirement to refuse using especially catastrophic 
weapons when “they are not necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives 
and thereby minimize collateral damages to civilians.”97 
Necessity is the source of some confusion in international humanitarian 
law. For example, it is “often misunderstood to mean that regardless of the law, 
warriors can do whatever it takes to win.”98 But in fact other jus in bello 
principles constrain necessity, often by way of incorporation, weaving a sort of 
web of interconnected laws of war designed to reduce civilian death and harm. In 
this connection, Jeffrey G. Lewis and Scott Sagan propose that when it comes to 
necessity, states should refrain from using nuclear weapons when they are not 
necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives, thus minimizing civilian death 
and suffering.99 
Because we know that nuclear weapons are quantitatively and 
qualitatively different from all conventional weapons, this limitation makes sense. 
When one considers the extensive blast power and coverage, the pervasive 
radioactivity, and the prolonged suffering, as well as the severe environmental 
harms spawned by nuclear weapons, it becomes almost impossible to conclude 
that they would result in less civilian harm than conventional weapons near a 
civilian population. Thus distinct principles of the humanitarian law of necessity 
(which authorizes an attack to help overcome the enemy that is not contrary to 
other jus in bello principles) and proportionality (which requires a proportionate 
attack) exhibit a synergistic relationship supporting one another to prevent civilian 
death and harm to the most realistic extent possible.100 
Indeed, in a famous statement by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion, the Court observed: “The threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, and in particular rules of humanitarian law.”101 Critical to this reasoning 
was the humanitarian law of necessity. The Court explained that one of the 
preeminent rules requires that an “armed attack” must be “necessary,” a rule that 
interacted with the proportionality requirement and that had been “well 
established in customary international law.”102 As Lewis and Sagan point out, the 
                                                
96 BRITISH JOINT SERVICE, PUBLICATION 383 THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 22, ¶ 2.2.2 (2004) (quoting General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of 
Armies of the United States in the Field (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 245, 247–74 (1881)).  
97 Lewis & Sagan, supra note 64, at 64; see Additional Protocol I, supra note 75, art. 57(2)(a)(ii).  
98 LUBAN ET. AL, supra note 94, at 1041. 
99 See Lewis & Sagan, supra note 64, at 64. 
100 As a proposition, especially with regard to the weapon used, this is more of a normative rather 
than a descriptive statement.  
101 Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 105.  
102 Id. ¶ 41. 
2018 / Duty to Disobey 
 
107 
concept of military necessity was not just whether nuclear weapons were a 
military necessity to knock out a certain target, but also whether “the means 
themselves were necessary to the target and thus permissible.” 103  Hence, 
holistically viewed, both military necessity and the means of achieving those 
necessities merge into an analysis ultimately designed to reduce civilian casualties 
and harm.104 A case can therefore be made that where conventional weapons 
would achieve the same military objective as a nuclear weapon, but with less 
civilian death and suffering, the nuclear strike is manifestly illegal under necessity 
principles. 
4. Prevention of Unnecessary Suffering and Superfluous Injury 
Like the principle of distinction, prevention of unnecessary suffering and 
superfluous injury also appears in Additional Protocol I as a Basic rule. The rule 
provides: “It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and 
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering.” 105 International humanitarian law recognizes that both death and 
suffering of combatants and civilians will occur. What is impermissible is causing 
unnecessary suffering. 
Although this rule is designed chiefly to protect combatants,106 in modern 
day usage it tends to be applied to civilians as well.107 Thus the long-term effects 
of cancer and other diseases and harms throughout the lifetimes of both civilians 
and military survivors must be taken into account and must inform the contextual 
inquiry of whether the nuclear strike will cause unnecessary suffering and 
superfluous injury. Given these considerations, it would be a rare situation in 
which a nuclear option (as opposed to a conventional one) would not cause 
superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering. Accordingly, in the vast majority of 
situations in which a nuclear weapon is used over a conventional weapon, the 
nuclear option would be manifestly illegal.108 
5. Belligerent Reprisals 
One potential wrinkle in this Article’s argument is the controversial 
doctrine of belligerent reprisals. These are “acts in breach of the law of a rule of 
armed conflict directed by one belligerent party against the other with a view to 
inducing the latter party to stop violating that or another rule of international 
                                                
103 Lewis & Sagan, supra note 64, at 69.  
104 See also William H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 
295, 304 (2004) (“The condition of ‘necessity’ . . . requires that no reasonable alternative means of 
redress are available.”). 
105 Additional Protocol I, supra note 75, art. 35(2).  
106 See Maresca & Mitchell, supra note 48, at 637. Protection of civilians fits better under the 
category of proportionality, however. 
107 Id.  
108 Again, biological weapons provide a good analogy: like nuclear weapons, their scope and 
consequences are far larger and longer lasting than conventional weapons, causing larger degrees 
of suffering far into the future. 
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humanitarian law.”109 In other words, the doctrine authorizes a state to violate a 
rule of international humanitarian law as a means of halting another state’s 
violation of international humanitarian law. As such, it permits an otherwise 
unlawful act by one state in order to bring another state into compliance with the 
law. The ICJ gave only an oblique nod to the doctrine in its Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion, noting that reprisals are prohibited against the enemy’s 
environment,110 and are subject to standards of proportionality.111 
Here one must distinguish between proportionality in ordinary 
international humanitarian law and the exceptional situation of proportionality in 
belligerent reprisals. The proportionality standard in ordinary international 
humanitarian law is proportionality between expected civilian casualties and 
military advantage.112 Under the principle of belligerent reprisals, however, the 
reprisal must be proportionate to the breaching state’s original violation of 
international law.113 The reprisal does not have to be identical to the original 
breach (something that could, theoretically, plant the seed of a new customary 
norm), but it must be proportionate. In other words, if State A breaches Rule X of 
international law, State B need not also breach Rule X to constitute a legitimate 
reprisal. Rather, State B can breach Rule Y so long as breaching Rule Y is 
proportionate to breaching Rule X. Moreover, once the initial violation has 
stopped, so too must the belligerent reprisal.114 
A belligerent reprisal must meet a number of other criteria for the 
otherwise unlawful act to be justifiable under international humanitarian law. It 
must, for example, be intended to coerce the initially breaching party back into 
compliance (as opposed to, say, punishing that party).115 Further, it must be 
necessary. Like proportionality, in the context of belligerent reprisals the principle 
of necessity takes on another meaning. Unlike necessity in ordinary international 
law, which authorizes an attack to help overcome the enemy, necessity in the 
context of belligerent reprisals means that the reprisal is a sort of last-resort option 
after peaceful measures of persuasion have failed,116 or what is sometimes called 
                                                
109 Fritz Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals Revisited, 21 NETH. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 43, 44 (1990).  
110 See Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 31. 
111 See id. ¶ 46. 
112 See supra Part IV.B.2.  
113 See Stuart Casey-Maslen, The Use of Nuclear Weapons as a Reprisal Under International 
Humanitarian Law, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 171, 178 (Gro Nystuen, 
Stuart Casey-Maslen & Annie Golden Bersagel eds., 2014). 
114 See Louis Maresca & Eleanor Mitchell, The Human Costs and Legal Consequences of Nuclear 
Weapons Under International Law, 97 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 621, 643 (2015). 
115 See Paula B. McCarron & Cynthia A. Holt, A Faustian Bargain? Nuclear Weapons, Negative 
Security Assurances, and Belligerent Reprisal, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 203, 222 (2001); 
Theodore Richard, Nuclear Weapons Targeting: The Evolution of Law and U.S. Policy, 224 MIL. 
L. REV. 862, 921 n.364 (2016).  
116 Almost by definition, these measures, which include diplomatic and economic sanctions, for 
example, as well as belligerent reprisals themselves, must be decided upon at the highest level of 
government, see, e.g., Casey-Maslen, supra note 113, at 177, a trait that comports with the overall 
theme that the most critical military decisions are made high up in the chain of command. 
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the principle of subsidiarity.117 Naturally, in some contexts, as in the launch of a 
weapon of mass destruction against a state, virtually no alternative means of 
inducing compliance are possible prior to the belligerent reprisal—a scenario 
discussed below. 
There is also the problem of escalation. Namely, one unlawful breach will 
lead to another unlawful breach, which in turn will lead to another unlawful 
breach, and so on. Belligerent reprisal doctrine tries to avoid this outcome by 
placing precincts on the originally breaching state by preventing what might be 
thought of as counter-belligerent reprisals118—say, State A violates the law, State 
B undertakes a belligerent reprisal, State A may not then undertake a counter-
belligerent reprisal. Nonetheless, real-world warfare may not obey such 
constraints,119 leading to the dreaded “parade of horribles” and, in large part, to 
the controversy surrounding the doctrine. Other criteria insist that the initial 
breach be a serious violation of international law; that the reprisal must be in 
response to an initial breach (there is no such thing as a pre-emptive belligerent 
reprisal); and that the reprisal cannot be undertaken against certain targets.120 It is 
this last criterion that causes the most concern when it comes to nuclear weapons 
and civilian death and suffering. 
Although there is an observable trend in humanitarian law to protect 
civilian life outright in all situations, including with respect to belligerent 
reprisals, Casey-Maslen concludes after careful study that custom is 
underdeveloped in the belligerent reprisal area and, as a result, “customary law 
has not yet outlawed belligerent reprisals against civilians in enemy territory.”121 
This leads to a vexing scenario for this Article’s thesis: Suppose State A launches 
an illegal strike against both a military and a civilian population in State B, 
violating essentially all or most principles of humanitarian law. To the extent an 
illegal conventional weapon strike by State B complies with the belligerent 
reprisal criteria, and is as effective as a nuclear strike in bringing State A into 
compliance with the law, it should be used. However, if conventional weapons 
cannot achieve the goals of belligerent reprisals and induce the other state into 
compliance with the law, an otherwise illegal nuclear strike may be warranted.122 
                                                
117 Casey-Maslen, supra note 113, at 176–77.  
118 Maresca & Mitchell, supra note 48, at 643. 
119 Richard, supra note 115, at 975 (recounting “history’s caution that reprisals tend to escalate 
conflicts rather than bring parties back into conformity with the law”).  
120 Maresca & Mitchell, supra note 48, at 176–84; see also Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 31. 
121 Casey-Maslen, supra note 113, at 190. 
122 If in response to a conventional weapon strike, a nuclear strike may also contravene a “no first 
use” policy, whereby a state promises that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a 
conflict. See Dominick Tierney, Refusing to Nuke First: Why Rejecting Nuclear Preemption 
Reflects Strength, Not Weakness, ATLANTIC (Sept. 14, 2016)  
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/nuclear-obama-north-korea-
pakistan/499676/ [https://perma.cc/Q9JF-VGWG] (explaining the doctrine of no first use). 
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Note that this scenario may contemplate a manifestly illegal use of nuclear 
weapons by the reprising state. Under proportionality requirements it is hard (but 
not impossible123) to imagine a belligerent reprisal involving nuclear weapons 
being used in response to anything other than a prior unlawful attack similarly 
employing nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, rendering the nuclear 
belligerent reprisal situation (one hopes) unlikely or at least rare in the current 
geopolitical environment. 
What does all this mean for the Article’s argument? In one sense, it 
remains undisturbed. Where conventional weapons can achieve the same 
objectives as nuclear weapons, conventional weapons should be used. But in 
another sense, the doctrine of belligerent reprisals is exceptional in that it may 
authorize what is otherwise a manifestly illegal nuclear strike in certain 
circumstances; namely, the use of nuclear weapons despite their unique 
characteristics. 
At this point one might ask: But if a manifestly illegal nuclear strike 
targeting civilians with nuclear weapons leads to war crimes, how does that 
square with the doctrine of jus cogens, or peremptory norms of international law, 
which trump everything else—including, presumably, the doctrine of belligerent 
reprisals? Would the jus cogens norm prohibiting war crimes not create liability 
for all who planned and executed a reprisal authorized by international 
humanitarian law? 
Possibly not. Recall that jus cogens norms only prohibit certain conduct 
that violates international law; they say little to nothing about liability resulting 
from that violation. If the doctrine of belligerent reprisals is to be taken seriously 
under humanitarian law as justifying otherwise unlawful conduct, it may be 
treated as a species of affirmative defense to liability for the violation of 
international humanitarian law. Here the violation of the jus cogens norm is 
disaggregated from the accountability mechanism of enforcing international law. 
Unlike jus cogens, international humanitarian law does have accountability 
mechanisms, and rather robust ones at that. This is where the defense of 
belligerent reprisals comes in. The war crimes endure as violations of jus cogens, 
but under international humanitarian law, no liability attaches. 
C. Human Rights Law 
In addition to humanitarian law (the law of war), international human 
rights law (the law that protects human rights everywhere the world over) has 
something to say about whether a nuclear strike is legal. Questions exist as to 
                                                
123 Imagine a very large, militarily powerful state that threatens the sovereign existence of a small 
one without using nuclear weapons. The defenders of the small state might feel that only the 
nuclear option would be a sufficient reprisal, triggering a complex, but unfortunately endemic, 
proportionality question: proportionate to what? If the small state ceases to exist but the large state 
endures despite the nuclear attack, it could be rather difficult to conclude that the small state’s 
reprisal was disproportionate. 
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whether and how human rights law overlaps with humanitarian law during times 
of armed conflict. 124  Such overlap would theoretically create concurrent 
jurisdiction: both laws govern the same conduct, leading to a potential conflict of 
laws. The ICJ’s view in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion resolved this 
potential conflict by essentially incorporating the standards of humanitarian law 
into the standards of human rights law, effectively reconciling any conflict such 
that while both laws apply, a single standard governs—namely, that of 
humanitarian law.125 
The technique used to arrive at this solution commonly goes by its Latin 
name, lex specialis. Lex specialis simply means that the more specific law 
governs over the more general.126 According to the ICJ, because international 
humanitarian law governs the more specific situation of armed conflict, it wins.127 
This is not to say that it pushes human rights law out of the way entirely. Rather, 
human rights law also applies. But instead of prescribing its own separate 
standard, it adopts or is informed by the lex specialis of humanitarian law. 
Although the Court has more recently moved away somewhat from the lex 
specialis concept to a more complementary approach,128 there is no reason to 
believe that it has changed its opinion from its statement in the Advisory Opinion 
that “whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in 
warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of 
the [International] Covenant [of Civil and Political Rights], can only be decided 
by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the 
terms of the Covenant itself.”129 
What does this mean for the duty to reject a nuclear strike order? First, any 
war crime that results in civilian deaths violates not only humanitarian law but 
also human rights law—in particular, the right against the arbitrary deprivation of 
life.130 Second, given what we know about the potential destructive power of 
nuclear weapons and their far-reaching, long-term effects, it would not be 
                                                
124 See infra note 127. 
125 See id.  
126 See Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2461, 2464 (2008). 
127 See generally supra note 61; Marko Milanovic, The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking 
the Relationship between Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, in THEORETICAL 
BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Jens David Ohlin ed., 2014); DARAGH 
MURRAY ET. AL, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2016). 
128 Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 106 (July 9); Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. 
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168 (Dec. 19). 
129 Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at ¶ 25. 
130 Id. ("The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby 
certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to 
life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's 
life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then 
falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict 
which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities."). 
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inconceivable for some court to find that their use constitutes an arbitrary 
deprivation of life. For these violations too are subject to universal jurisdiction.131 
Which leads to the third point: human rights law has far more robust and effective 
accountability mechanisms than humanitarian law for obeying manifestly illegal 
orders. There are, of course, regional human rights regimes that guarantee redress 
in the form of investigation and, if warranted, prosecution.132 But more and more, 
national courts are stepping in to fill the accountability void for serious violations 
of international law in civil rather than criminal suits. And presumably the 
signatories to the new Nuclear Weapons Ban treaty 133  will widen this 
accountability in terms of committed jurisdictions. 
To take one example, the Alien Tort Statute in the United States grants 
U.S. district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations.”134  These torts include 
violations of the law of nations like war crimes and arbitrary loss of life.135 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court cut back mightily on the scope of this statute by 
restricting it to torts that “touch and concern” U.S. territory,136 presumably a 
nuclear strike ordered from or against the United States would easily meet that 
criterion. Again, given what we know about the pervasive effects of nuclear 
blasts, an individual suit or even an enormous class action seeking to enforce 
human rights under the statute seems entirely plausible. 
V. Chain of Command 
The next issue relates to the chain of command and control when it comes 
to ordering a nuclear strike. This issue is central to the Article’s argument because 
in order to impose a duty and a right to refuse to execute the order, a reasonable 
person must have sufficient information to conclude that the order is manifestly 
illegal. Put another way, the law would not bestow a right, and assuredly not a 
duty to which liability attaches, unless the individual in question had the requisite 
facts to make an informed legal judgment. 
For instance, suppose the legislature passes a secret law. The law is on the 
books but nobody knows about it because it is secret. Basic rule-of-law principles 
would disqualify the law’s application as fundamentally unfair because any 
individual to whom the law would apply would have had no notice of the law’s 
existence, let alone its substantive provisions. In somewhat similar fashion, a 
crewmember on a nuclear submarine who simply receives strike coordinates 
ought not to be held liable if he does not, or reasonably should not, know the 
                                                
131 For an analysis of offenses subject to universal jurisdiction, see Colangelo, supra note 65, at 
149. 
132 See Casey-Maslen, supra note 34, at 669–70. 
133 Klimas, supra note 2. 
134 28 U.S.C. 1350 (2006). 
135 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), 
aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff'd 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
136 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 125 (2013). 
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situation surrounding the strike, what it is targeting, and the probability of 
manifestly illegal loss of civilian life and attendant war crimes.137 While the secret 
law is fundamentally unfair since there is no notice of the law, the ignorant 
crewmember scenario is fundamentally unfair because he has insufficient 
knowledge of the facts. Despite the difference in ignorance between law and facts, 
the same basic principle applies. 
In turn, we must discern within the chain of command and control who has 
what information when ordering the strike to determine who has the duty and the 
right to reject an illegal strike order. I shall use the chain of command in the 
United States for illustrative purposes because it is both the one with which I am 
most familiar and about which I can gather the most information. I hope that this 
Article may stimulate similar examinations of the nuclear command hierarchies of 
the other eight nuclear weapons states as well as NATO. 
Further, the legal argument presented here strongly confirms that the chain 
of command all the way down and across, including all support functions and pre-
strike planning, receives and provides personnel with sufficient knowledge and 
information to judge and reject an illegal order. For the duty to evaluate and reject 
illegal orders resides not only in high-up positions that craft the options but also in 
those who ultimately execute them.138 Although it occurs in practice, it is actually 
an abdication of duty to keep those in the last line of the launch sequence in the 
dark about the humanitarian laws of targeting distinction and discrimination, 
proportionality, military necessity and other legal principles; as well as about 
factual information regarding the unique features of nuclear weapons and the 
strike’s intended target and options of conventional weapon use instead.139 Only 
                                                
137 This is generally the case. See Kehler, supra note 19, at 55 (“In many (perhaps most) cases, 
nuclear crews will not know the specifics of the target they are being ordered to strike.”). So long 
as a gray area exists in which some strikes may be legal and there is not a comprehensive ban on 
nuclear weapons, a low-level crewmember may not be able to tell whether the order he is given is 
manifestly illegal if he is not given sufficient knowledge surrounding the order. 
138 Id. (explaining that “[m]ilitary members are bound . . . to follow orders provided they are legal 
and have come from competent authority. They are equally bound to question (and ultimately 
refuse) illegal orders or orders that do not come from a competent authority. Further, they are 
trained that they must apply the principles of law while executing those illegal orders. Ensuring 
that the military members who would actually deliver nuclear weapons can verify that nuclear 
control orders are both legal and have come from competent authority is an important 
responsibility of commanders at all levels.”); see also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Taming Shiva: 
Applying International Law to Nuclear Operations, AIR FORCE L. REV., 157, 162 (1997); accord 
email from Major Harold Herring to Anthony Colangelo (Aug. 29, 2017, 15:19 CDT) (“In 
retrospect, it seems to me our deterrence would be more credible if those charged with the 
awesome responsibility of launching nukes would, as human beings with consciences, had the 
information to remove any doubt now instead of wrestling with the issue when an order came 
down.”).  
139 Kehler, supra note 19, at 55. 
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with this knowledge of the law and the facts about a particular strike can the low-
level crewmember fulfill his duty to reject an order as manifestly illegal.140 
A. The President 
A natural starting place in the chain of command is the person with the 
sole power to order the launch of a nuclear weapon: the president.141 Although not 
technically subject to the superior-orders defense, the president is the one who 
ultimately gives the order (and thus can be liable for it) so therefore the position is 
included in this discussion. It is theoretically possible that the president could 
simply pick up the phone and give an order to a low-level crewmember to launch 
a nuclear weapon, though this is not how the decision occurs in practice.142 
Nonetheless, past presidents have gone so far as to preauthorize the use of nuclear 
weapons for top military commanders under specified, emergency conditions.143 
The release of nuclear weapons is also governed by what is referred to as 
the “two-man rule” (though as we will see, it is a rule that does not bind the 
president) in order to prevent accidental or malicious launches by a single 
individual.144 At the highest level, this rule asks that the president jointly issue 
launch orders with the Secretary of Defense and continues down the chain of 
command with commanding officers and executive officers working in tandem, 
and missile operators agreeing on launch order validity.145 However, this check on 
                                                
140 As Kevin John Heller explains, for example, the Nuremberg tribunals required at least some 
information on the part of commanders that the proposed action either was, or should have been, 
known to be illegal in order to generate the duty to disobey the order, although the mens rea 
element vacillated between a knowledge and a negligence standard. See KEVIN JON HELLER, THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 266–69 
(2011). A lack of knowledge on the part of uninformed crewmembers who are, say, simply given 
strike coordinates appears not to meet either of those mens rea standards given (1) the gray area in 
which a nuclear strike may be viewed as illegal (or may not) combined with, (2) this Article’s 
argument that nuclear weapons may be used where conventional weapons would fail, and (3) the 
manifestly illegal standard not just an illegal standard. Which is not to say that keeping the 
crewmembers in the dark ought to be the way the chain of command should function. Accord 
Mark Oisel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86 CAL. L. REV. 
939, 944 (1988) (suggesting that “new knowledge about the bases of cohesion among troops and 
about the sources of war crimes suggests that military law should, at key points, abandon its 
traditional insistence on bright-line disciplinary rules in favor of general standards of 
circumstantial reasonableness. This approach would encourage the exercise of deliberative 
judgment where only rote order following has hitherto been sought”).  
141 Kehler, supra note 19, at 55. 
142 See infra Parts V.B and C. 
143  See William Burr, First Declassification of Eisenhower’s Instructions to Commanders 
Predelegating Nuclear Weapons Use, 1959-1960, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (May 18, 2001), 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB45/ [https://perma.cc/G28X-647B] (examples of 
such specified, emergency conditions include a sudden Soviet attack on major U.S. forces in 
Europe, or a Soviet launch on U.S. territory when the president could not be reached). 
144 U.S. Air Force, Instruction 91-104, Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs 
(2013), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afi91-104.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FSX-Z92W].  
145  JASON FRITZ, HACKING NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL 16 (2009), 
http://www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC8A-34X4]. 
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the president’s authority may be illusory, because there is nothing the Secretary of 
Defense could do to stop such a presidential strike order, as military officers 
ordinarily will likely launch nuclear missiles from a valid, presidential 
command.146 Incidentally, the Secretary of Defense has never refused to concur 
with a presidential order to launch nuclear weapons (which is not surprising given 
that it has only happened twice, and both times during World War II); hence the 
strength of this check on the president’s power is, at this moment, unknown. The 
point therefore remains that the president has the sole power to directly call the 
crewmember and issue a command. In such a situation, only the president would 
likely be exposed to liability for a manifestly illegal order, unless of course the 
president fills in the crewmember with sufficient detail about the strike such that 
he or she should know whether it is manifestly illegal under humanitarian and 
human rights law. 
Thus, just as with the international law analysis, analysis of who has the 
relevant information and when they have it is a contextual inquiry dependent upon 
the specific situation surrounding the specific strike order.147 Provision of such 
information to all individuals down the chain of command should occur, but may 
not be practical for, say, technical or operational security reasons. Yet one thing is 
certain: because the president enjoys exclusive authority to issue the order, any 
duty and accompanying liability for a manifestly illegal strike runs straight up the 
chain of command to the very top. 
B. STRATCOM and Related Bodies 
Again, however, a direct order from the president to a crewmember is not 
how a nuclear strike order would likely operate in practice. Rather, STRATCOM 
and related bodies like the combatant commands (CCMDs), along with the 
civilian chain of command, develop options for the president should he 
contemplate any order ranging from a nuclear strike to those made in emergency 
or crisis situations.148 Thus the primary decision to strike and the strike’s broad 
objectives always rest in the president’s hands, while his military and civilian 
chain of command craft options for achieving those objectives. These options may 
include the nuclear option, about which the president receives detailed 
information.149 This process of crafting options comprises the bread and butter of 
the duty and right to recognize and reject a manifestly illegal order. The fact that 
those in the chain of command do not actually “pull the trigger” does not relieve 
them of liability, as the High Command case from the Nuremburg tribunal makes 
                                                
146 BRUCE G. BLAIR, STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL 112 (1985). 
147 Telephone Interview with Philip Coyle, Senior Sci. Fellow at the Ctr. for Arms Control and 
Non-Proliferation; and Assoc. Dir. for Nat’l Sec. and Int’l Affairs in the White House Office of 
Sci. and Tech. Policy (Apr. 27, 2017).  
148 Kehler, supra note 19, at 57–58. 
149 60 Minutes: The New Cold War—60 Minutes gets a rare look inside U.S. Strategic Command 
and discovers the extraordinary measures the military takes to make sure only the president can 
launch a nuclear attack, David Martin Correspondent (CBS News television broadcast Sept. 18, 
2016),  http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-new-cold-war-nuclear-weapons-david-martin/.  
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clear. 150 As noted above,151 because the inquiry is so contextual, it is possible that 
anyone down and across the chain of command—including those who develop the 
targeting options and packages, those who review them for their legality, and 
particularly well-informed crewmembers—would also have this duty and right.152 
C. Multistage Vetting 
Fortunately for the United States, the chain of command seriously strives 
to incorporate the proper international humanitarian law (and thus human rights 
law) into the options presented to the president.153 Kehler describes a five-stage 
process in developing options, each of which is designed not only to meet the 
president’s objectives but also to fastidiously comply with international law. The 
stages comprise option development, target selection, weapon application, legal 
advice and review, and other effects.154 
While each stage considers the legal implications of the strike, 
humanitarian law most informs the “target selection” and “weapon application” 
stages.155 Moreover, and crucially to this Article’s argument, at the “other effects” 
stage “[p]lanners also consider other nuclear weapon effects beyond blasts (such 
as fire; electromagnetic pulse; radiation) in their modeling analysis.”156 Finally, 
embedded in and finalizing the process are lawyers tasked with ensuring the strike 
complies with humanitarian law.157 
D. Immunities 
But what if a strike is likely to be deemed manifestly illegal by a 
competent judicial body, whether domestic or international? Would it make any 
real difference at all, other than symbolic, since the president and those high up 
the chain of command—precisely those who most likely would be charged with 
the duty to reject the order—might be cloaked in immunities, especially vis-à-vis 
                                                
150 HELLER, supra note 140, at 254–59.  
151 Coyle interview, supra note 147.  
152 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 75, art. 57(2)(a). As is probably evident at this point, the 
“strike” in this Article’s title encompasses not just pressing the button to launch the weapon, but 
also all of the planning and decision-making leading up to that moment. That is, it encompasses 
orders to use nuclear weapons. 
153 Indeed, this was one of the major motivations for a comprehensive overhaul of STRATCOM’s 
internal workings beginning in 2012. Kehler, supra note 19 at 56, 58. Up until that point, “nuclear 
plans . . . were still largely based on guiding principles formed in the late 1980s and early 1990s.” 
Id. at 56. A number of problems with these earlier principles were “spiraling weapon requirements 
during the Cold War and a continuation of ‘Cold War thinking’ beyond it (especially as attention 
was diverted to conventional combat operations).” Id. at 57. Instead of a comprehensive and 
coherent policy streamlined to meet modern tactical needs, the pre-2012 STRATCOM protocols 
seemed more of an incremental cobbling together of ad hoc steps as the global situation changed. 
It was by no means static, but it was cumbersome and retained outdated Cold War vestiges. 
154 Id. at 59.  
155 Id. at 58-59. 
156 Id.  
157 Id. 
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those judicial bodies most likely to hold them accountable, like foreign and 
international tribunals? 
Two initial rejoinders: first, as the ICJ has noted, immunity would not 
apply before an international tribunal with jurisdictional competence;158 second, it 
is unclear how far down the chain of command immunity would extend. Certainly 
heads of state and officials like foreign ministers who represent the state on the 
international stage enjoy the privilege.159 But beyond that, the law is unclear. The 
whole reason heads of state and foreign ministers enjoy immunity is that the state 
would be unable to effectively represent itself in its dealings with other states if 
these individuals were stuck in foreign states’ docks. Conversely high-ranking 
members of STRATCOM and other planning bodies likely fall outside the scope 
of immunity. Needless to say, the farther down the chain one goes, the less 
immunity is likely to apply. Overall, only heads of state and perhaps other 
extremely high-ranking officials would likely be immune from suit before foreign 
tribunals. 
Immunities before domestic state courts come in various flavors. Foreign 
sovereign immunity, or foreign state immunity, immunizes from suit foreign 
sovereigns qua sovereigns. 160  Thus, foreign sovereign immunity immunizes 
Italy—the sovereign state—from suit in U.S. courts. In the United States this form 
of immunity is currently governed by statute, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act of 1976.161 Foreign official immunity or, where applicable, head-of-state 
immunity,162 shields from suit particular high-ranking officials of foreign states, 
such as heads of state and foreign ministers.163 Thus, foreign official or head-of-
state immunity immunizes the Italian president and, presumably, prime minister 
from suit in U.S. courts. 
A further distinction exists between immunity that attaches because of a 
particular status, such as being head of state or other high ranking official, and 
immunity that attaches because of the nature of the particular conduct underlying 
a claim, such as conduct performed as part of the actor’s official duties. These 
immunities are referred to, respectively, as status-based immunity and conduct-
based immunity.164 Status-based immunity is basically an absolute protection for 
certain high-ranking officials (like heads of state) against all proceedings in other 
                                                
158 Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 
I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 61 (Feb. 3). 
159 See Anthony J. Colangelo, Jurisdiction, Immunity, Legality, and Jus Cogens, 14 CHI. J. INT’L. 
L. 53, 57 (2013).  
160 HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 1 (3d ed. 2013).  
161 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as 
amended in various sections of U.S.C. Title 28). 
162 Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 324 (2010). 
163 Id. at 321 n.15. 
164 Chimène I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity and the "Baseline" Problem, 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 605, 605 (2011).  
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states’ courts.165 That is, it blocks all foreign proceedings against these officials, 
irrespective of whether the proceedings relate to the officials’ public or private 
acts or whether the acts occurred during or before the officials’ tenure in office.166 
However, because the immunity attaches only to the officials’ status as an office 
holder, once tenure in office ceases so too does the status-based immunity.167 
At this point, the only immunity potentially available to former officials is 
conduct-based immunity. This form of immunity is both broader and narrower 
than status-based immunity. It is broader in the sense that it arguably extends to 
anyone acting on behalf of the state, not just high-level officials, and it also 
continues to protect former officials after they have left office. But it is narrower 
because, as its name suggests, it applies only in respect to official conduct.168 A 
key question in both U.S. and international law is whether this conduct-based 
immunity attaches in respect to conduct that constitutes serious violations of 
international law and, more specifically, jus cogens violations like war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. 
The reason why status-based immunity does not yield to jus cogens is that 
courts have deemed it “jurisdictional.”169 That is to say, it simply deprives the 
court of jurisdiction to hear the case while the officeholder enjoys the privilege of 
the office. However, once the officeholder leaves office, the immunity lapses 
because the office no longer blocks the court’s jurisdiction.170  
Conduct-based immunity is somewhat more complicated. Courts have yet 
to definitively say that it is entirely jurisdictional; thus it may constitute a 
substantive defense—in which case it would come into direct conflict with, and 
necessarily yield to, the peremptory norm.171 And since a jus cogens violation 
cannot qualify as a legitimate official act there exists the possibility of suit, 
whether criminal or civil, where a high-ranking official issues or fails to reject a 
manifestly illegal order. In other words, the substantive defense of immunity will 
be no barrier to the enforcement of jus cogens, which by definition override all 
                                                
165 See Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court, 98 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 407, 410 (2004).  
166 Id; Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 769 (4th Cir. 2012). But see Ingrid Wuerth, Pinochet’s 
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contrary norms. However, as noted, the law on this topic is in flux. Moreover, 
according to its own internal processes, a state may waive immunity as to its own 
current or former officials before foreign courts.172  
In sum, immunities are not the substantial bar to suit they may first appear 
to be. They do not apply before international tribunals with competent 
jurisdiction; they do not apply to individuals who do not represent the state on the 
international plane; and, even for high-ranking officials who do represent the state 
on the international plane, suit is possible if immunity is waived or, after the 
official leaves office, the immunity is deemed substantive and conflicts with, and 
thus yields to, jus cogens. 
VI. Non-State Actors 
It may be tempting to conclude that none of what has been said so far 
about the duty to disobey illegal nuclear strike orders applies to terrorists or other 
non-state actors. Certainly, a strict reading of conventional law and, in particular, 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, covers only “states parties” to 
the treaties. But as Part IV explained, the law against war crimes is not simply 
treaty-based. Rather, it has passed into customary international law. Moreover, it 
is now considered peremptory international law subject to universal jurisdiction. 
This means that it applies universally to everyone, everywhere.173 In fact, as 
crimes of universal jurisdiction, any state in the world can prosecute irrespective 
of whether the state has any connection to the offense.174 
Here it is not just the norm that is customary law, but also the liability that 
attaches to that norm—and it attaches not just to states but also to individuals. At 
least since Nuremburg, international and domestic jurisprudence have been clear 
that individuals may be held liable for serious violations of international law. And 
because the relevant international law includes a universally applicable customary 
law enforceable by all states, non-state actors cannot escape its net. 
VII. Conclusion 
The beginning of this Article posed the question of whether the duty to 
disobey illegal nuclear strike orders merely constituted an affirmative defense in 
military proceedings or whether it stood for something more for the international 
legal system as a whole. The answer should be plain: Executing a nuclear strike 
order that personnel know or should know is manifestly illegal will likely result in 
                                                
172 See FOX & WEBB, supra note 160, at 30–32, 105; Mamani v Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1151 n.4 
(11th Cir. 2011) (stating that "[w]e accept that the present government of Bolivia has waived any 
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liability for potentially anyone in the world for some of the most serious offenses 
under international law, like war crimes and arbitrary loss of life. This duty 
constitutes a powerful legal norm with far-reaching implications for humanitarian 
law and practice, diminishing in some scenarios the lawful possible use of nuclear 
weapons to the vanishing point. It also constitutes a powerful counter-norm that 
argues against the use of nuclear weapons as a matter of policy and strategic 
decision-making. The overall import of the combination of this norm and counter-
norm is to marginalize nuclear weapons, giving them no meaningful place—under 
international law or within the international legal system generally—among the 
lawful options available to a commander considering an attack near a civilian 
population. 
